In some …rms the CEO makes all the major decisions. In other …rms decisions are more clearly the product of consensus among the top executives. The distribution of decision-making power within …rms should therefore a¤ect which decisions are made. Managerial decisions may or may not a¤ect …rm outcomes, but if they do, both executive characteristics and organizational variables should be important determinants of …rm performance.
In this paper, we use these ideas to develop a simple hypothesis about how the CEO's ability to in ‡uence decisions will a¤ect …rm performance. In a …rm in which only the CEO makes the most relevant decisions, the risk arising from judgment errors is not well diversi…ed. That is, the likelihood of either very good or very bad decisions is higher in an organization in which the CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions is greater than in an organization in which many executives are involved in decision-making. Therefore, our hypothesis is that variability in …rm performance increases with the degree of CEO in ‡uence, because decisions with extreme consequences are more likely to be taken when the CEO is more powerful.
Because our hypothesis concerns di¤erences in performance variability, we apply di¤erent heteroskedasticity tests to our data. Our sample contains data on 336 …rms from the 1998 Fortune 500 over the 1992-1999 period. We measure the CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions using …rm-level characteristics of the Executive O¢ce, such as whether the current CEO is a founder of the …rm, whether he is the only insider sitting on the Board, and the CEO's concentration of job titles to proxy for the number of people participating in decision-making together with the CEO.
We …nd evidence that stock returns are more variable in …rms in which the CEO has greater power to in ‡uence decisions. We …nd similar results using ROA and Tobin's Q as alternative measures of performance. The results hold both across and within …rms, and are statistically and economically signi…cant for some measures of CEO power. The evidence is particularly compelling for the measure of power that uses the status of the current CEO as a founder of the …rm. However, the other measures of power also appear to be positively related to performance variability, particularly the variable measuring whether the CEO is the only insider sitting on the Board. Furthermore, when we use the industry classi…cation of Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) to identify industries where managers are likely to have high discretion to in ‡uence decisions, we …nd that all three of our measures of CEO power are positively associated with stock return variability in industries where CEOs can have a large impact on corporate performance. After performing addi-tional tests that address potential endogeneity concerns, we conclude that the positive correlation between CEO power and performance variability is consistent with causation running from power to performance.
Our paper adds to a large literature that tries to assess the impact of managers on …rm outcomes.
In the management literature there is some controversy over whether top executives matter. An early reference on the view that managers do not matter is Lieberson and O'Connor (1972) , who …nd that CEO e¤ects have little additional explanatory power for …rm pro…tability (see also Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996, and Pfe¤er, 1997) . In contrast, authors such as Child (1972) , Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Tushman and Romanelli (1985) argue that executives do matter, an idea that is supported by numerous large-sample studies evaluating the importance of executives for outcomes (Weiner and Mahoney, 1981) . Many papers in economics and …nance analyze related questions. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) …nd evidence consistent with …rms optimally choosing directors for their characteristics. Denis and Denis (1995) , Weisbach (1995) , Parrino (1997) , and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2001) all show evidence that CEO turnover is related to …rm outcomes. Malmendier and Tate (2003) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) identify some top executives' characteristics that are related to …rm outcomes.
Our point in this paper is that executives can only impact …rm outcomes if they have in ‡uence over crucial decisions. By focusing on CEO power we highlight the idea that performance depends on the interaction between executive characteristics and organizational variables. Thus we can use …rm-level characteristics to test predictions that are related to unobservable managerial characteristics. The characteristics we are concerned with in this paper are the CEO's opinions, which are not easily observable. Therefore, we use our measures of CEO power, which are …rm-level variables, to assess the impact of CEOs' opinions on performance. In addition, it is di¢cult to predict how executive characteristics should a¤ect outcomes. Our approach allows us to identify a precise testable implication: if executives' opinions di¤er, concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the CEO should lead to more variability in …rm performance.
We develop our theoretical hypothesis and discuss related literature on managerial e¤ects and decision-making in groups in section 1. We describe our measure of CEO power in section 2 and the data in section 3. We test our empirical hypothesis in section 4 and investigate endogeneity issues in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Theoretical Arguments and Literature Review
Two important issues in this paper are the de…nition of power and its measurement. Although there are several di¤erent de…nitions of power in organizations, according to Pfe¤er (1997) , "in order to demonstrate in ‡uence and control, most de…nitions of power include the idea of overcoming resistance" (p. 138). In addition, to distinguish power from chance it is necessary that the ability to overcome resistance be consistent (March, 1966) . Accordingly, we view powerful CEOs as those who can consistently in ‡uence key decisions in their …rms, in spite of potential opposition from other executives. However, this de…nition does not lend itself to natural and unequivocal measures of CEO power, because CEO power may come from many formal and informal sources (Pfe¤er, 1992) . We postpone to section 2 the discussion of the practical problems that arise when measuring a CEO's decision-making power.
Our hypothesis is that …rms in which the CEO has less power to in ‡uence decisions will have less extreme performances. With less power, more moderate decisions will be taken because the CEO will have to compromise with other members of the top management team when they disagree with him. Similar ideas have been discussed in the economics, management, organization theory and organizational behavior literature.
The most related argument that can be found in the economics literature is in the work of Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) . They compare outcomes under di¤erent structures of group decisionmaking when individuals make judgment errors. In their models, because group members may disagree, group decision-making entails a diversi…cation of opinions e¤ect. The …nal group decision will be a compromise that re ‡ects the di¤erent opinions of the group members. In their 1986 paper they show that larger groups are more likely to reject bad projects because a project is only accepted if several group members agree that it is good. For the same reason, large groups are also less likely to accept good projects. As they state most clearly in their 1991 paper, one of the implications of their theory is that performance should be less variable when a greater number of executives have in ‡uence over decisions. 1 In their work, increases in the size of the decision-making group have 1 Sah and Stiglitz's models do not have a clear prediction for the e¤ect of the size of the decision-making group on average performance. This relationship depends on variables such as the pro…tability of projects, the probability that projects are either good or bad, and on the convexity of the function relating managerial decisions to performance. See Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) . similar e¤ects as a decrease in the power of a particular decision-maker. Thus, the hypothesis that performance variability increases with CEO power follows naturally from their setup. 2 Sah and Stiglitz justify their assumption that managers may disagree using the ideas that communication is costly, or that people di¤er in their abilities to process information. 3 Other authors suggest that disagreement is especially likely when the decision-making group in consideration is a top management team. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argue that managerial biases, egos, and experiences a¤ect …rm behavior because of the ambiguity and complexity that characterize the tasks of top managers. According to Mischel (1977) , strategic decision-making in …rms is a "weak situation," one in which the choices of decision-makers are likely to vary widely and are hard to predict.
The idea that variation in senior executives' choices is important for understanding …rm behavior is behind the large management and organizational behavior literature on managerial discretion, which is surveyed by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) . This approach is part of a debate on whether managers "matter" for …rm decisions and outcomes. Hannan and Freeman (1977) de-emphasize the impact of managerial choices on …rm performance because of organizational and environmental constraints that limit the scope of managerial actions. In contrast, Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Tushman and Romanelli (1985) argue that executive leadership is a fundamental driving force in the evolution of organizations. In particular, the managerial discretion literature argues that managers' impact on organizational outcomes depends on how much discretion they have: "...discretion attenuates the relationship between executive characteristics (values, experiences and so on) and organizational outcomes. Namely, if high discretion exists, executive orientations become re ‡ected in organizational outcomes; if low discretion exists, they do not." (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) Our hypothesis in this paper is a natural consequence of blending together the notions of "weak situation" and managerial discretion. Because top managers make decisions in weak situations, the quality of their decisions is bound to be variable. In situations where the CEO is more powerful, he has more discretion to in ‡uence decisions. The …nal decision will thus re ‡ect the CEO's opinion more directly, and will be more variable than decisions made by a group of top managers. 4 The social psychology literature on group decision-making has also analyzed the speci…c e¤ect of group processes on di¤erent dimensions of group decisions, such as their extremity and riskiness. As discussed by Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) , a natural hypothesis is that the "group consensus" (the …nal choice made by a group) represents "an averaging, a compromise among individual positions". This idea is supported by a number of experimental research …ndings, such as those of Kogan and Wallach (1966) , who …nd that group judgment represents the average of the prior individual judgments even when consensus is achieved via group discussion of each prior judgment. 5 Neither Sah and Stiglitz's theory, nor the management and organizational behavior literature discussed above are based on agency arguments. Agency theory generally does not predict a positive relationship between CEO power and performance variability. In fact, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have suggested that an increase in uncertainty (as measured by the volatility of stock returns) may increase the scope for moral hazard. Therefore, when uncertainty increases, principals should put more constraints on agents' behavior. 6 To the extent that CEO power increases the scope for CEO misbehavior, Demsetz and Lehn's argument would therefore predict a negative correlation between CEO power and performance variability, which would make it more di¢cult for us to …nd an e¤ect of power on variability. 4 Although the management and organizational behavior literature never explicitly develops the hypothesis that a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions should be positively related to the variability in decisions and performance, many papers on top management teams are consistent with the underlying mechanism that drives our hypothesis. For Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) , dominant CEOs may "nullify the e¤ects of the other members". For Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) , in situations where the CEO is less dominant there is "greater sharing of information and more consensus" in decision-making. 5 There is also some experimental evidence on phenomena that attenuate the diversi…cation e¤ect of groups. Di¤erent situations in which groups appear to make risky choices have been labeled as "risky shifts" (Wallach and Kogan, 1965) , "group polarization" (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969) , and "groupthink" (Janis, 1982) . As pointed out by a referee, the conceptualization of risk in this literature is somewhat di¤erent from our notion of variability in outcomes, thus it is unclear whether these phenomena have any e¤ects in our empirical tests. 6 For example, if the scope for agency problems increases, it might be desirable to separate the positions of Chairman of the Board and CEO (e.g. Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999) . Similarly, it might be desirable to have a CEO position occupied by someone other than a founder of the …rm.
Measuring CEO Power to In ‡uence Decisions
In order to perform our empirical tests, we need to measure how much decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of the CEO. "Power" is a concept that has di¤erent dimensions to it, not all of them easily observable. Focusing on the power of individuals in top management teams, Finkelstein (1992) identi…ed four sources of power: structural power (related to the distribution of formal positions within an organization), ownership power, expert power, and prestige power.
In our work, we try to identify whether other individuals at the top of the managerial hierarchy are participating in decision-making with the CEO. The higher the number of relevant decisionmakers, the less powerful the CEO is likely to be. Thus, we focus mostly on structural power, particularly the power the CEO has over the board and other top executives as a consequence of his formal position and titles, status as a founder, and status as the sole insider on the board. Our paper therefore does not provide evidence that all forms of CEO power are related to performance variability.
Our …rst measure of CEO power is a dummy variable that indicates whether the CEO is also one of the company's founders. Consistent with the management literature (Donaldson and Lorch, 1983; Finkelstein, 1992) we consider CEOs who are also founders to be more in ‡uential.
Our second measure of CEO power is a dummy that indicates whether the CEO is the only insider on the board. We expect that if an inside manager (other than the CEO) sits on the board, he is more likely to participate in top decision-making with the CEO. 7 Thus, we consider CEOs in …rms with more than one inside manager on the board to have less in ‡uence power. Our interpretation of the "CEO only insider" variable is related to the number of individuals who can in ‡uence decision-making together with the CEO. This is consistent with the idea that other insiders may be rivals for the CEO's power and position (Ocasio, 1994) . However, this interpretation di¤ers from the one usually given to this variable in the agency literature, which tends to view a board dominated by insiders as a sign that the corresponding …rm is not run in the interests of minority shareholders.
Finally, we construct a dummy that measures the concentration of titles in the hands of the CEO.
This dummy is equal to one if the CEO accumulates both the Chairman and the President titles.
For example, if the CEO is not the Chairman of the Board, we expect him to have less in ‡uence over decisions, since the Chairman often has an important role in strategic decision-making. 8 To the extent that the successor of the CEO is involved in decision-making prior to becoming CEO, the CEO succession process of a …rm also in ‡uences the degree of joint decision-making in the …rm. The two most familiar types of CEO succession processes (Vancil, 1987; Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997) are horse races, in which the …rm conducts a tournament among eligible candidates for the position of CEO, and passing the baton, in which the …rm chooses a designated successor for the CEO. In the latter case, a new CEO often also has the title of President. Once he plans his succession, he hands the title of President to the heir apparent. If the CEO has an heir apparent then there is a gain to grooming him by involving him in CEO level decision-making. Thus, if the CEO does not also hold the President title, we expect him to have less power to in ‡uence decisions.
In contrast, if a …rm's succession process typically consists of a horse race, then the candidates for the CEO position are more likely to be of equal rank and thus have titles such as Vice President or Executive Vice President (Naveen, 2000) or the candidates may have titles associated with di¤erent divisions. If the …rm conducts a tournament for the CEO, then it may be di¢cult to involve all candidates fairly in CEO decision-making. In addition, involving the candidates in CEO decision-making may have drawbacks since the losers of the tournament generally leave the …rm.
In this case the …rm will be less likely to have a President or COO, and the highest concentration of titles in the hands of the CEO occurs when he is the Chairman. Therefore, we also set our dummy measuring the concentration of titles to be equal to one if the CEO is the Chairman, and no President or a COO title exists. Our dummy measuring the concentration of titles in the hands of the CEO will thus be equal to one either if the CEO is the Chairman and the President, or if the CEO is the Chairman and no President or COO exists. 9
Data Description
Our sample consists of data on publicly traded …rms in the 1998 Fortune 500 during 1992-1999.
We exclude …nancial …rms and utilities, and restrict our sample to the set of …rms for which data is available on ExecuComp (2000) . From Standard and Poor's ExecuComp (2000) we obtain information on all executives mentioned in the …rms' executive compensation table as well as …nancial information. We obtain monthly stock returns for the sample …rms as well as value-weighted market returns from CRSP. We gather the remaining …nancial information from Compustat and the date of the …rm's incorporation from Moody's Industrial Manuals (1999), proxy statements and annual reports for …scal 1998. Our …nal sample consists of data on 336 …rms during the 1992-1999 time period. 10 The data we gather on executives contain information on whether the named executive sits on the board and the title of each executive. If the named executive is the CEO, we also obtain the year in which he became CEO and his ownership in the …rm. We de…ne the dummy "CEO only insider" in a given year to be equal to 1 if no executive mentioned in the …rm's executive compensation table except the CEO sits on the board in that year. We de…ne the dummy "CEO's concentration of titles" to be equal to one if the CEO is both the Chairman and the President or if he is the Chairman and if the …rm has no President nor a COO amongst the executives mentioned in the compensation table for that year. 11 We de…ne an indicator variable "CEO = Founder" to be equal to 1 if the current CEO is one of the founders of the …rm and zero otherwise. Since ExecuComp (2000) does not contain information on whether the CEO is also a founder, we construct this variable in the following manner. We set "CEO = Founder" in a given year equal to 0 if the …rm was incorporated at least 64 years prior to the current year, because in such cases it is unlikely that the …rm would have a founder as the current CEO. Founders should also be part of the company from the very beginning. Thus, we set "CEO = Founder" in a given year equal to 0 whenever the current CEO joined the company at a date 4 years or more after the …rm's date of incorporation. 12 For the remaining …rm-years we checked whether the current CEO was one of the …rm's founders in a variety of sources consisting of proxy statements, annual reports and the internet. We set "CEO = Founder" in a given year equal to 1 if any source explicitly named the current CEO as a founder or the main executive at the time the company began (including when it was spun-o¤).
We use stock returns (monthly stock returns including dividends from CRSP) as our main performance measure, but we also use return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's Q to verify the robustness of our results. The tests using ROA capture whether CEO power impacts accounting performance, while the relation between CEO power and Q captures the e¤ect of power on market values. We de…ne ROA as the ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to the book value of assets. Our measure of Tobin's Q is the ratio of the …rm's market value to its book value. The …rm's market value is calculated as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics concerning select …nancial variables, CEO characteristics and our measures of a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions. In 9% of …rm-years the CEO is also one of the founders. In most …rm-years another insider other than the CEO sits on the board (71%). CEOs are more likely to accumulate the title of Chair (86%) than the title of President (27%). Overall, CEOs have concentrated titles in 41% of the …rm-years.
The correlations (not shown in the table) between our three measures of CEO power are relatively low, indicating that these measures capture di¤erent aspects of CEO power. The highest correlation is between "CEO's concentration of titles" and "CEO only insider" (0.19). This is not surprising, given that these two variables may capture similar aspects of CEO power. For exam-1 2 The longest period of time a CEO has been working for his …rm in our sample is 59 years. We set our cuto¤s of 64 years and 4 years to account for missing data on CEO …rm tenure. Since most …rms are founded several years prior to the date of incorporation, and since we also check whether CEOs are founders when they joined the …rm within 4 years of the …rm's date of incorporation, our procedure ensures that we check more CEOs than are likely to be founders. ple, when the CEO is the Chairman of the Board and the President, it is less likely that there is another insider on the board (because the Chairman and President are usually inside executives).
In contrast, "CEO = Founder" is negatively correlated both with "CEO's concentration of titles" (-0.10), and with "CEO only insider" (-0.01).
CEO Power and Performance Variability
In this section, we …rst apply heteroskedasticity tests to our data in order to test our main hypothesis. Our hypothesis has implications both for the variability of performance across …rms and for within-…rm variability of performance. Thus we perform our tests using a panel of …rms, in which both e¤ects (across-…rm and within-…rm variabilities) should be present. However, the nature of our sample (many …rms but relatively few years) suggests that the panel results might be driven primarily by across-…rm variation in performance. Therefore, in section 4.2 we also try to isolate the within-…rm e¤ects by regressing the standard deviation of the performance measures over 1992-1999 on our measures of CEO power and controls. 13 In section 4.3 we examine whether the e¤ect of CEO power on the variability of performance is greater in industries where managerial decision-making faces fewer environmental constraints. Finally, following Shivdasani and Yermack (1997) we consider the CEO's involvement in director selection as an alternative measure of power in section 4.4. In what follows, we are primarily concerned with providing evidence of a correlation between a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions and the variability of performance measures. We postpone the discussion of possible endogeneity problems and causality issues to section 5.
Figure 1 presents some descriptive evidence which is consistent with our hypothesis. We construct average excess stock returns for each …rm in our sample, by taking the di¤erence between a …rm's average stock return and its beta times the average market return over the 1992-1999 period.
For simplicity, we construct an aggregate power index that is the sum of our three measures of CEO power, "CEO = Founder," "CEO only insider," and "CEO's concentration of titles," and plot the stock return residuals for the …rms with the highest 20% and the lowest 20% values of the index.
The cross-sectional variability of performance is clearly higher in the sample in which CEO power is high. Thus these …rms are the ones with the best and the worst stock returns in the period we consider. 14 We now turn to formal tests of our hypothesis using some standard heteroskedasticity tests. 15
Heteroskedasticity Tests
The heteroskedasticity tests we perform use the residuals of the performance measures after controlling for variables which could explain the level of the performance measures. Thus, they require us to specify a model for our performance measures. We use a simple market model for stock returns (SR), with the market return MR (value-weighted market return from CRSP) as the single factor:
We use monthly stock returns to estimate our betas and residuals for the 1992-1999 period.
For Tobin's Q and ROA, we estimate similar models as those estimated by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) , Yermack (1996) , and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) . The main di¤erence is that we include our measures of CEO power among the explanatory variables because they may a¤ect average performance, even though we have no clear prior for the direction of this relationship (see the discussion in section 1, especially footnote 1). Our estimates for the empirical model we use for Tobin's Q are as follows (heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses): 
# segments
The coe¢cients on all control variables are broadly consistent with the ones found in the previous literature. The variables measuring the power of the CEO to in ‡uence decisions have ambiguous e¤ects on average …rm performance. We …nd that "CEO = Founder" is positively and signi…cantly correlated both with Q and ROA, but the "CEO only insider" variable is negatively and significantly correlated with ROA, while positively and signi…cantly correlated with Q: The "CEO's concentration of titles" variable seems to have no e¤ect on ROA and Q. Of the theoretical arguments discussed in section 1, the most clear prediction for the direction of the e¤ect of CEO power on performance comes from agency theory: if high power allows CEOs to become entrenched, power should have a negative e¤ect on performance. The evidence from the level regressions is not consistent with this agency argument, indicating that our measure of CEO power may not be capturing entrenchment e¤ects.
In this section we apply Glejser's (1969) heteroskedasticity test to our sample. 16 To conduct the Glejser test, we regress the absolute value of the residuals b u from our empirical models for each of the three performance measures (equations 1, 2 and 3) on our measures of CEO power and a vector of controls z which we hypothesize should be associated with the variability in …rm performance:
+¯3CEO's concentration of titles + µz + e An F -test of the hypothesis that all slopes equal zero is a test of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity against the alternative that the variance of …rm performance is a function of "CEO = Founder," "CEO only insider," "CEO's concentration of titles" and z. To test whether a particular measure of power j a¤ects the variability of performance we use a t-test for the null¯j = 0.
1 6 For further details about this test, see Amemiya (1985) .
A positive¯j and high t-statistics are evidence that the particular measure j is positively related to the variance of …rm performance after controlling for the other measures of power and z.
Our benchmark vector of controls z includes CEO ownership and its square, the degree of diversi…cation (the number of di¤erent two-digit SIC segment codes), …rm size (natural log of assets), …rm age (number of years since date of incorporation), leverage (book value of long term debt divided by book assets), CEO tenure (the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO) and its square, capital expenditures over sales, and two-digit-SIC industry dummies.
We include ownership as a control because Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that …rms with disperse ownership (and thus potentially with more severe agency problems) engage in more conglomerate acquisitions in order to reduce risk, even when this is not optimal for shareholders. If the CEO has higher ownership, he will then have less incentive to reduce risk. We include the tenure variables to control for life-cycle learning or signalling e¤ects. We include leverage because it might a¤ect the volatility of performance variables, particularly stock returns. We also expect bigger, older, and more diversi…ed …rms to exhibit less variability in performance. We include industry dummies to control for the fact that some industries might be inherently more volatile than others. Finally, we include any additional variables that we used in the …rst-stage regression to construct the residuals, because variables which a¤ect average performance could also a¤ect the variance of performance.
We do not use …rm …xed-e¤ects in our speci…cation, because our measures of CEO power vary little over time for a given …rm (in approximately 80% of the …rm-years the three measures of power are constant from one year to the next). 17 In addition, we expect di¤erences in variability to be more systematically related to industry, which we control for. We always use heteroskedasticitycorrected standard errors when calculating our t-statistics, since the residuals of these regressions are heteroskedastic by construction. 18
In Table 2 we report the results of regression (4) for the three performance measures. The null of homoskedasticity is always easily rejected against the alternative that the variance of …rm performance is a function of "CEO = Founder," "CEO only insider," "CEO's concentration of titles," since in all cases the estimated coe¢cients on the measures of CEO power are jointly signi…cant at a 5% level or better. 19 Column I reports the results for stock returns. Since we use monthly data for stock returns and annual data for the controls, we adjust the t-statistics for non-independence within …rm-year.
The is approximately equivalent to the e¤ect of an increase in CEO ownership from 0 to 8%, a change that is more than one standard-deviation in CEO ownership in our sample (5%).
Columns II and III use ROA and Q as alternative performance measures. All three of our measures of CEO power enter with positive signs in the regressions explaining the variability in Q, but only "CEO = Founder" is signi…cant (column III). When we use ROA (column II), the only signi…cant variable is again "CEO = Founder". "CEO's concentration of titles" enters positively in the ROA regression, and with a higher t-statistic than in the stock return regression (p-value of 0:12 for a t-statistic of 1:55). "CEO only insider" enters negatively in the ROA regression but is far from being signi…cant (p-value of 0:27).
The tests in this section are consistent with our hypothesis that CEO power and performance variability are positively related. Furthermore, these tests suggest that the retention of the CEO title by one of the founders is the most signi…cant variable a¤ecting the variability of performance, followed by the absence of insiders other than the CEO on the board. The evidence for "CEO only insider" is especially strong for the variability in stock returns. "CEO's concentration of titles" by itself does not play a signi…cant role.
In ‡uence Power and Variability Over Time
The previous panel regressions use information both on within-…rm and cross-sectional variability of performance. In order to check whether CEO power increases the likelihood of both good and bad decisions within a given …rm, we also perform a test which allows us to isolate the e¤ect of in ‡uence power on the within-…rm, over-time variability of performance.
The tests performed in this section are also useful to di¤erentiate our hypothesis from other plausible stories that focus primarily on the di¤erences in the cross-sectional variability of performance. One possibility is that CEOs who become powerful are either very good at maximizing …rm value or very good at value-decreasing political activities. Because the panel results are also driven by cross-sectional variability, this story can potentially explain the results in Table II , even if CEO power per se has no direct e¤ect on …rm performance. 20 However, this story does not necessarily imply that, within the same …rm, high CEO power should be associated with both good and bad decisions, and thus higher variability of performance over time.
We compute the sample standard deviation of stock returns, ROA and Q for each …rm using their monthly (for stock returns), and yearly (for ROA and Q) values from 1992 to 1999. Then, we regress them on the possible determinants of variability. We use the same set of controls as in equation 4. The data for the regressors are averages over the whole period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . Table 3 displays the results. As in Table 2 , in all cases the measures of CEO power are jointly signi…cant at a 5% level or better. Our measures of CEO power are also positively associated with the over-time, within-…rm variability of performance. Similarly to Table 2 , "CEO = Founder" has the most consistent e¤ect across all speci…cations. In the stock return regression (column I), only 2 0 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this hypothesis.
"CEO = Founder" is signi…cant, while the coe¢cients on both "CEO only insider" and "CEO's concentration of titles" are positive but not signi…cant.
The economic e¤ect of the measures of CEO power on the within-…rm volatility of stock returns also appears to be large. The magnitude of the coe¢cients on "CEO only insider" and "CEO's concentration of titles" are similar to the e¤ect of one-standard-deviation changes in variables such as …rm age and …rm size. The coe¢cient on "CEO = Founder" has an impact which is of the same magnitude as a one-standard-deviation change in CEO ownership.
While in the Q regression "CEO = Founder" is the only one of our three measures of power that signi…cantly a¤ects variability, the ROA regression (column II) suggests a more balanced role for the three measures of performance. They all enter signi…cantly in this regression, with coe¢cients of similar economic magnitude. Given that the average standard deviation of ROA across all …rms is 3:21, the estimates imply that each of the three measures of power increases the variability in ROA by a factor of approximately 26% to 40% relative to the mean. Tables 2 and 3 are the following. First of all, a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions seems to be positively related to the variability in …rm performance, both in the panel tests (Table 2 ) and in the tests that isolate the within-…rm, over-time variability of performance (Table 3) . Of the three alternative measures of CEO power, the retention of the CEO title by one of the founders is the most consistently signi…cant variable a¤ecting performance variability, but there is also some evidence that the other two measures of power are positively related to performance variability, especially the absence of an insider on the board other than the CEO. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) classify the factors that a¤ect managerial discretion into three main categories: internal organization, environmental factors (such as the industry in which the …rm operates), and managerial characteristics. 21 In the previous sections we used variables related to the internal organization of the …rm to measure CEO power. In this section, we also examine the e¤ect of environmental factors.
Our overall conclusions from the results in

Industry Measure of Managerial Discretion
The management literature has argued that managerial discretion varies from industry to industry because of factors such as product di¤erentiability, capital intensity, the degree of competition, and regulatory constraints (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) . Therefore, in this section we examine whether the e¤ect of CEO power on the variability of performance is greater in industries where managerial decision-making faces fewer environmental constraints.
We use Hambrick and Abrahamson's (1995) industry discretion ratings for seventy 4-digit SIC code industries to classify the industries of our sample …rms into high and low discretion categories. 22 To maximize the positive matches with our data we average their measures by 2-digit SIC code industry, and construct an indicator variable ("High discretion industry") which is equal to 1 for industries at the top 40% of the distribution of the 2-digit-SIC code rating of managerial discretion, and is equal to 0 for industries at the bottom 40% of the same distribution. We eliminate the …rms in industries that rank from the 40% to the 60% percentile of the distribution, because managerial discretion in such industries is more likely to be measured with error. 23 Table 4 reports the results of incorporating "High discretion industry" into our analysis. We focus on stock returns in Table 4 and use the same control variables as in the previous tables with the exception of the 2-digit industry dummies because they are collinear with "High discretion industry" (we omit the coe¢cients on the control variables for the sake of brevity). Column I shows the results of replicating the same test as in Table 2 , but with "High discretion industry" added to the list of explanatory variables. The positive and signi…cant coe¢cient on "High discretion industry" is consistent with the idea that performance should be more variable in industries where managers have more discretion. Since the e¤ect of our measures of CEO power on the variability of performance should also be greater in industries where managers have more discretion, in column II we add the interactions between our three measures of power and "High discretion industry". 24
Once we include the interaction terms, our three measures of power are no longer signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. Since by construction these variables measure the e¤ects of CEO power on performance variability in the sub-sample of …rms operating in low discretion industries, this implies that power has virtually no e¤ect on variability in those industries. In contrast, the coe¢cients on all three interaction terms are positive and signi…cant, which suggests that a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions does a¤ect performance in industries where managers face fewer environmental constraints. Finally, "High discretion industry" is no longer signi…cant, which indicates that variations in industry discretion matter less if a CEO's power is low. Columns III and IV replicate the results for the within-…rm variability test. The results are consistent with our previous results, although they are less signi…cant due to the reduced degrees of freedom.
In Table 5 we replicate the regressions in Table 4 using ROA and Q as alternative measures of performance. For the sake of brevity, we report only the regressions that include both the high discretion dummy and its interactions with our measures of CEO power. The results are very similar to those in Table 4 : consistent with our main hypothesis, all three of our measures of CEO power have a stronger positive e¤ect on performance variability when CEOs are in industries where they can have a larger impact on corporate performance. 25 Shivdasani and Yermack (1997) argue that CEOs are more powerful when they are involved in nominating directors, because directors appointed by the CEO are less likely to monitor him. 26 Thus, when the CEO is involved in the board nominating process he might have more power to in ‡uence decisions. On the other hand, because of the board's limited day-to-day involvement, it is not clear to what extent changes in board structure will signi…cantly change the number of people who e¤ectively participate in decision-making together with the CEO. For example, changes in the number of independent outside directors may not have a large impact on the power of the CEO to in ‡uence decisions, because outside directors ultimately depend on the CEO for the provision of …rm-speci…c information.
CEO Involvement in Director Selection and Performance Variability
using the full sample to estimate the e¤ects of the other variables on performance variability.
In this section we examine whether a CEO's involvement in the selection of new directors is also related to performance variability. As in Shivdasani and Yermack (1997) , the CEO is de…ned to be involved in director selection either when the board has a nominating committee and the CEO sits on it, or when the board does not have a nominating committee. We extend Shivdasani and
Yermack's data on the 1994 Fortune 500 …rms over the 1994-1996 by collecting data from proxies for the remaining …rm-years in our sample. 27 Our summary statistics are very similar to those in Shivdasani and Yermack (1997) . The board has a nominating committee which includes the CEO in 22% of the …rm-years, and has no nominating committee in 18% of the …rm-years, resulting in a total of 40% of …rm-years in which the CEO is involved in director selection.
In Table 6 we include a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO is involved in director selection in our regression analysis, and test whether this variable is positively related to performance variability. We only report the stock return results, but the results are the same for the other performance measures: there is no correlation between a CEO's involvement in director selection and performance variability. This is true both when we include the CEO's involvement dummy together with the other variables in the analysis (columns II and IV), or when we include the CEO's involvement dummy by itself (columns I and III). This is also true both for the Glejser tests (columns I and II), and for the over-time variability tests (columns III and IV).
One possible reason why we …nd no relation between a CEO's involvement in director selection and performance variability is that this variable may not be a good measure of the board's power to in ‡uence decisions. For example, many nominating committees may still solicit advice from a CEO who is not a member, as discussed in Shivdasani and Yermack (1997) . Another possibility is that the board may delegate decision-making authority to the top management team, so that the power of the CEO over the board matters less for performance variability than the power of the CEO over other inside executives. Some evidence consistent with this idea is that "CEO only insider" is positively related to performance variability. While our other measures of CEO power 2 7 We thank David Yermack for providing us with their data. In our data collection process, we …rst collected data every other year from 1992 to 1999 (taking into account the …rm-years we already had in Shivdasani and Yermack's data). Then we checked all the cases where the CEO's involvement status changed from year t to year t + 2: If the CEO's involvement status was constant in years t and t + 2; we assumed it was also the same in year t + 1: For the …rms for which we have 3 successive years of data, it was never the case that we observed reverse changes in the CEO's involvement status in 2 consecutive years. Thus, we believe our data contains only minimal measurement error.
combine both aspects of power, "CEO only insider" is more directly related to the distribution of power within the top management team (see section 2).
Endogeneity and Causality Issues
There appears to be a robust positive correlation between our proxies for a CEO's power to in ‡u-ence decisions and performance variability. While the theoretical arguments discussed in section 1 suggest a causal relationship from CEO power to variability, the evidence could also be consistent with alternative stories that emphasize the reverse causation: more variability in performance may lead to increases in CEO power to in ‡uence decisions. In this section, we address the potential endogeneity problem in two di¤erent but complementary ways. We describe the results below but omit the tables (these are available upon request).
Does Performance Predict CEO power?
Most reverse causality stories that have been suggested to us are very similar and can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, if …rms have performed well in the past, it might be easier for CEOs to force changes that increase their power. On the other hand, following poor performance, …rms may want to purposefully concentrate decision-making power in the hands of the CEO in order to make faster decisions. This argument could explain our …ndings, since the best and the worst performers tend to be in the sample of volatile …rms.
We explore the explicit temporal dimension of this story to assess its empirical relevance. Specifically, we evaluate whether lagged extreme performances predict increases in CEO power, and also perform the reverse experiment: we evaluate whether changes in CEO power help predict either very high or very low performances in the near future. In order to do this, we create a dummy variable called extreme that equals 1 for either very high or very low values of stock returns and is zero otherwise. 28 Our results indicate that lagged changes in the "CEO only insider" variable help predict future extreme performances: the …rst two lags of changes in "CEO only insider" are positively and signi…cantly related to the extreme variable. In contrast, lagged extreme performances do not predict increases in "CEO only insider": if anything, the e¤ect of the second lag of extreme is negative (and marginally signi…cant), suggesting that past extreme performances, either good or bad, might actually tend to reduce a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions. 29 This …nding casts doubt on theories that try to explain the positive correlation between power and variability by postulating causation from variability to CEO power, and it provides further evidence that "CEO only insider" captures a dimension of CEO power that helps explain performance.
Two-Stage Least Squares
We also use instrumental variables methods to try to isolate the e¤ects of CEO power on performance variability from other sources of variation. Because instrumental variables techniques are most directly applicable to them, we focus here on cross-sectional regressions of performance variability on measures of CEO power similar to those in section 4.2. We focused on …nding instruments for the (empirically) most signi…cant measure of power in those regressions, which is "CEO = Founder."
The …rst variable we use as an instrument ("dead founders") is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the founder died before the start of our sample period and zero otherwise. 30 The motivation for the use of this instrument is simple: dead founders cannot be CEOs. Furthermore, the death of a founder should be a fairly exogenous event which will a¤ect the likelihood that the current CEO is one of the founders but does not have a plausible direct e¤ect on performance, except when the founder happens to be the CEO. Our second instrument is the number of founders of each …rm. We believe that this variable also satis…es the necessary conditions for a valid instrument for two reasons. First, the probability that the current CEO is one of the founders is mechanically increasing in the number of founders. Second, the number of founders is unlikely to have any direct e¤ect on the variability of …rm performance years after the founding event.
2 9 There is no signi…cant result for the other two measures of CEO power. However, "CEO only insider" is the only measure of power that displays signi…cant variability over time for a single …rm. There is a change in this variable in 16% of …rm-years. In comparison, in only 7% of …rm-years there is a change in "CEO's concentration of titles", and there are almost no changes in "CEO = Founder" (1% of …rm-years). Thus, it is hard to tell whether our …ndings are due to the fact that "CEO only insider" is a more important predictor of extreme performances, or to the fact that it changes more over time in our sample.
We replicate the regressions of Table 3 using a 2SLS procedure where "CEO=Founder" is instrumented with "dead founders" and the number of founders. 31 The second-stage coe¢cients on the "CEO = Founder" variable remain positive and statistically signi…cant. Furthermore, in all regressions that we ran the estimated e¤ect of "CEO = Founder" on performance variability was larger than the one obtained through OLS. For example, when we use the standard deviation of stock returns as the dependent variable, the coe¢cient on "CEO = Founder" increases from 0.021 (t-statistic of 2.65) to 0.089 (t-statistic of 3.07). This …nding and the results in section 5.1 suggest that reverse causation may be biasing us against …nding a positive correlation between CEO power and performance variability in simple OLS regressions. We conclude that the positive correlation between CEO power and performance variability is not only robust, but is also consistent with causation running from a CEO's power to in ‡uence decisions to performance variability.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provide evidence that …rm performance will be more variable as decision-making power becomes more concentrated in the hands of the CEO. We focus primarily on the power the CEO has over the board and other top executives as a consequence of his formal position and titles, status as a founder, and status as the sole insider on the board. Of the three di¤erent measures of CEO power that we use, the retention of the CEO title by one of the …rm's founders seems to have the most robust e¤ect on stock return variability. However, once we control for environmental constraints on managerial discretion we …nd that all three of our measures of CEO power are positively associated with stock return variability.
It is important to stress that our interpretation of these results does not depend on the existence of an agency problem. Even if managers are benevolent, corporate decisions may be good or bad because managers have di¤erent opinions.
A natural question that arises is whether the concentration of power in the hands of the CEO is good. The governance literature argues that is it not, and advocates the separation of the CEO and Chairman of the Board positions. Although this is not the main focus of the paper, we …nd no evidence that …rms with powerful CEOs have on average worse performances than other …rms. Instead, our results show that …rms with powerful CEOs are those with the worst, but also with the best performances. Thus, one important implication of our …ndings is that any policy recommendations for the design of governance structures should not be based on the consideration of isolated cases of extreme performances. In addition, our results point out one potential cost of diluting CEO power: although performance will be less variable, the probability of spectacular performance will be lower.
Our …ndings also have implications for the literature on group decision-making. They suggest that groups have a moderating e¤ect on corporate-decision making, consistent with Sah and Stiglitz's (1986, 1991) theories on decision-making and also with the managerial discretion literature (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) .
Finally, as Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) point out, there is little empirical research trying to explain volatility at the …rm level. Our paper suggests that managerial characteristics and the structure of decision-making may be important for understanding volatility. ExecuComp (2000) . Monthly stock return data (variable name = RET) and market returns (variable name = VWRETD) are from CRSP. Remaining financial data and segment data is from Compustat. Firm age is collected from Moody's Manuals (1999), proxy statements and 10-Ks for fiscal 1998. Founder data is collected from a variety of sources consisting of proxy statements, annual reports and the internet. The number of observations varies because of missing data. Our proxy for Tobin's Q is = (book value of assets-book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of assets. ROA = net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations/book value of assets. Leverage=long-term debt/assets. Firm age = #years since first date of incorporation. # of segments is equal to the number of different 2-digit SIC code industries the firm operates in. CEO tenure is the number of years since the CEO was appointed CEO. CEO ownership is defined as the ratio of the number of shares owned by the CEO after adjusting for stock splits to total shares outstanding. CEO = Founder is equal to one if the CEO is a founder of the company. CEO Only Insider is equal to one if the CEO is the only insider on the board of directors. CEO's concentration of titles is a dummy that is equal to one when both the CEO=Chair and the CEO=President dummies are equal to one, or when the CEO=Chair dummy is equal to one and the firm has neither a President nor a COO in that year. We regress the absolute value of the residuals from these regressions on CEO = Founder, CEO's concentration of titles and CEO Only Insider and controls including CEO ownership, squared CEO ownership, CEO tenure and its square, leverage, firm size, firm age, Capex/sales and # segments. All regressions include 2-digit SIC code industry dummies. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The coefficients on CEO tenure and firm age are multiplied by 10. The coefficient on CEO tenure squared is multiplied by 100.
Dependent Variable
Absolute value of excess stock return In Table 4 we examine whether our measures of CEO power have greater impact on the variability of performance when CEOs are in industries where they are likely to have more discretion. We construct our measure of managerial discretion using Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) 's ratings of managerial discretion for seventy 4-digit SIC code industries. We average their measures by 2-digit SIC code industry, and then we construct a dummy which is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to an industry at the top 40% of the distribution of the rating of managerial discretion, and is equal to 0 if the firm belongs to an industry at the bottom 40% of the distribution of the rating of managerial discretion. We examine the direct role of this dummy in columns I and III, and we interact the dummy with our measures of CEO power in columns II and IV. Columns I and II show the results using the Glejser test, and columns III and IV show cross-sectional OLS regressions of the standard deviation in stock returns, computed for each firm over the 1992-1999 period, on our measures of power and the same controls we use in Tables 2 and 3 averaged over the 1992-1999 period. The coefficients and t-statistics on the controls are omitted for the sake of brevity. The regressions do not include 2-digit SIC industry dummies because they are collinear with the industry ratings. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The coefficient on CEO's concentration of titles is multiplied by 10. In Table 5 we replicate the results of Table 4 using Tobin´s Q and ROA as alternative performance measures. We construct our measure of managerial discretion using Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) 's ratings of managerial discretion, as described in Table 4 . Columns I and II show the results of the Glejser tests, and columns III and IV show the results of regressing the standard deviations of cross-sectional OLS regressions of the standard deviation in ROA and Tobin´s Q, computed for each firm over the 1992-1999 period, on our measures of power and the same controls we use in Tables 2 and 3 averaged over the 1992-1999 period. The coefficients and t-statistics on the controls are omitted for the sake of brevity. The regressions do not include 2-digit SIC industry dummies because they are collinear with the industry ratings. Robust t-statistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. , where SR denotes monthly stock returns, MR denotes the monthly value-weighted market return and t ranges from 1992-1999. We regress the absolute value of the residuals on a dummy indicating whether the CEO is involved in director selection, and controls including CEO = Founder, CEO Only Insider and CEO's concentration of titles. Following Shivdasani and Yermack (1997) , the CEO is defined to be involved in director selection if the firm does not have a nominating committee, or if the firm has a nominating committee and the CEO sits on the committee. Columns III and IV show cross-sectional OLS regressions of the standard deviation in stock returns, computed for each firm over the 1992-1999 period, on the same variables. The regressions in all columns include 2-digit SIC code dummies. Robust tstatistics are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The coefficient on CEO involved in director selection is multiplied by 100. The coefficients on CEO's concentration of titles, CEO tenure, firm age and # segments are multiplied by 10. The coefficient on CEO tenure squared is multiplied by 1000.
Absolute value of excess stock returns 
